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Very  few  studies  have  explored  the  optimality  properties  of  the  "standard  model"  of  fertility  where 
parents must determine their optimal trade-off between quality and quantity. The present paper works to 
fill that gap and find three main results. First, when there exist positive externalities in the accumulation 
of human capital, it is optimal to subsidize education and to tax births. Second, when the Social Welfare 
Function does not consist of the average utility, the social returns on educational in- vestments can be 
weaker than the private returns when the optimal population growth rate is negative. In this case, the 
optimal economic policy consists in subsidizing births and taxing education. Finally, when the health 
expenditure is introduced as another source of positive externalities, it can be optimal to tax the parental 
health expenditure to decentralize the first-best path even if this expenditure is always too low at the 
laissez-faire equilibrium. 
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author. 1 Introduction
The economic analysis of fertility entered the modern era with the contribution of Becker
[1960]. This contribution paved the way for analyzing fertility behaviors with the tools of the
Marginalist Revolution. Becker [1960], Becker & Tomes [1973] and Becker & Lewis [1976]
represent fertility at the family level as the result of a rational decision-making process.
In addition to the usual commodities that were already present in microeconomic theory,
parents value both the quantity of children (the number of children they give birth to) and
their quality. Parents therefore must determine their optimal trade-oﬀ between quality and
quantity. In recent years, the Uniﬁed Growth Theory has put such a trade-oﬀ between
quality and quantity at the heart of the explanation of long-run growth and development.1
All these contributions have resulted in a uniﬁed framework that I here call the ”standard
model of endogenous fertility.” Surprisingly, very few studies have explored the optimality
properties of the trade-oﬀ between quality and quantity in this model.2 The present paper
works to ﬁll that gap, especially by emphasizing that the standard model of fertility displays
non-intuitive optimality properties and provides unusual recommendations for economic pol-
icy.3
The standard model of endogenous fertility displays three main characteristics. First,
parents value the number of their oﬀspring (quantity) as well as their future quality. The
valuation of children’s quality can take either an altruistic or a non-altruistic form. When
parents are altruistic toward their children as in Becker & Barro [1988] and Razin & Ben
Zion [1975], the future well-being of their children enter their own utility function. Thus,
their preferences are dynastic. In the alternative representation, as presented in Becker
& Lewis [1973] and Galor & Weil [1999], parents are not altruistic, but are characterized
by a joy of giving or a warming glow; that is, they directly value their children’s human
capital, their wealth, their health status, the ﬁnancial bequest they give them, or other
properties inherent to the children. This representation of parental preferences has been
1Among many others, see Galor & Weil [1996,1999], Galor & Moav [2002], De la Croix & Doepke [2003],
Kalemli-Ozcan [2003].
2I provide a review of this literature in section 2.
3Notice that, in this paper, family policies are limited to tax - transfer policies. In reality, familiy policies
include a large set of instruments like, for instance, coercive policies and preventive actions.
2favored by the recent Uniﬁed Growth Theory (UGT hereafter).4 Second, whatever the
representation that is chosen, parents maximize their expected utility subject to a non-
linear budget constraint.5 There is therefore a trade-oﬀ between quality and quantity. Third,
at least in the recent literature, models explicitly assume the existence of ineﬃciencies in
the production of child quality (see Galor [2005]). Quality of children is almost always
represented by their human capital. In other words, when parents choose their optimal
trade-oﬀ between quality and quantity, they do not internalize that their private investment
will improve the overall eﬃciency of the human capital accumulation process. It implies
that, at the laissez-faire equilibrium, their arbitrage between quality and quantity cannot be
optimal.
Intuitively, because only positive externalities exist in the accumulation of human capital,
one can expect that a subsidy on education spending ﬁnanced by a lump-sum transfer will
decentralize the social optimum. In the present paper, I show that this intuition is not
precisely correct. I demonstrate this through three important ﬁndings:
First, the ﬁrst-best social optimum cannot be decentralized with less than two Pigouvian
taxes6 and one lump-sum transfer. In the case where no diﬀerence exists between social
and individual welfare functions (Millian Social Welfare Function),7 these Pigouvian taxes
consist of a subsidy to education expenditure and a tax on births. Such a result comes
from the parental budget constraint, where quality and quantity enter multiplicatively. This
non-linearity implies that distorting the cost of quality to correct human capital externalities
distorts, in turn, the total cost of quantity: children become cheaper. A tax on child births
must be implemented to correct this second distortion. In other words, though fertility is
not a source of externalities, it has to be taxed. This result is robust to changes in the model
of fertility that is chosen.
Second, I show that when the Millian Social Welfare Function (SWF hereafter) is no
4See Galor [2005] for a review of this literature.
5This non-linearity is fundamental in models of trade-oﬀ between quality and quantity. Because quality
is provided to each child (with or without equity), its cost crucially depends on the quantity choices. Then
the parental budget constraint is no longer linear.
6Notice that I only focus on linear taxation. Without inqualities, it is not a strong assumption because
redistribution is not a matter of concern. Fan & Stark [2008] consider the impact of heterogenity on welfare
and policy analyses.
7A Millian Social Welfare Function consists of the average utility in the economy while a Benthamite
Social Welfare Function consists of the total utility in the economy.
3longer used, the optimal tax-transfer policy can involve taxing education and subsidizing
births. I construct a SWF that allows for the existence of a social preference for the popu-
lation stock. The Benthamite utility function consists in a special case of this SWF.8 The
existence of a social preference for the population stock introduces two additional eﬀects:
(i) Agents do not take into account that, when they make a child, they make it easier for
future generations to reach a larger population size. In other words, they do not internalize
the social returns on their investment in the quantity of children. (ii) If there exists a social
preference for the population stock, there also exists a preference for the largest generations
relative to the smallest ones.9 Thus, the social return on the investment in human capital of
one’s generation will depend on its size relative to previous and subsequent ones. Formally,
it is optimal to transfer welfare from smaller to bigger generations. Thus, when the optimal
population growth rate is positive, all other things being equal, the social return on the ed-
ucational investment is higher than the private return. Indeed, this investment will beneﬁt
a growing number of agents, so it is optimal to subsidize education spending. Conversely,
if the optimal population growth rate is negative, the largest generations are the current
generations and it is optimal to disincentivize parents to invest in their children’s human
capital in order to transfer utility from future to present generations. In other words, ceteris
paribus, the social return on education investment is lower than the private return, and it
is optimal to tax education.
My third main result comes from the introduction of endogenous child mortality that
is a natural extension of endogenous fertility models to adress for instance the issue of the
demographic transition. It changes the nature of the trade-oﬀ between quality and quantity.
Indeed, parents not only have to decide how to allocate their spending between quality and
quantity, they also have to decide their optimal strategy to reach their desired number of
children. In other words, they face a trade-oﬀ between quality and quantity of surviving
children in which their health expenditure will be a source of externalities.
In this extended model, higher parental health expenditure reduces child mortality. Fur-
thermore, the average level of health spending has a negative impact on child mortality. The
8Blackorby [2006] provides an enlightening discussion on the caveats of both the Millian and Benthamite
SWF.
9This eﬀect could be partially mitigated by the use of negative utility functions without changing the
main results of the paper. This will be more deeply discussed hereafter
4literature of development economics provides strong evidence that overall health quality is
one of the main determinants of individual health quality. For instance, Dasgupta [1993]
shows that 45 percent of all deaths in developing countries can be imputed to infectious and
parasitic diseases. Private health expenditure helps reduce the probability of being infected
when an agent is in contact with disease. Therefore, a higher average level of health expen-
diture reduces the probability of death in all families. This positive externality implies that
the private health expenditure is too low at the competitive equilibrium.
Here, I only consider the Millian case for simplicity. Reaching optimality requires, once
again, subsidizing education and taxing births. Now, the taxation of births plays the role of
an indirect subsidy on health expenditure. Indeed, it increases the cost of quantity relative
to the cost of health. To reach the same number of surviving children, parents tend to
increase their health expenditure and to give birth to less children. For strong externalities
on health expenditure, the indirect subsidy will not be suﬃcient to reach optimal health
expenditure at the competitive equilibrium. Therefore, the private health expenditure has
to be subsidized.10 Conversely, if the externality on health is weak relative to that on
education (small indirect subsidy), it is optimal to tax health expenditures in addition to
births.
The recommendation to tax births in complement to subsidies for education and health,
can be analyzed in the light of some empirical evidence from China and Sub-Saharan Africa.
Both regions face a problem of overpopulation and have implemented alternative strategies
to reduce fertility. My paper’s results are obviously theoretical and cannot reproduce the
very complex demographic, economic and political conditions of these countries. However,
it provides some bases from which their strategies can be called into question.
China is experimenting with a speciﬁc ﬁscal scheme on births that subsidizes the ﬁrst
birth and strongly taxes subsequent ones. However, empirical studies such as those of Kanbur
& Zhang [2003] and Fan & Zhang [2000] show that investment in education and health is
insuﬃcient in China. The present paper proposes an alternative ﬁscal scheme that would
reallocate public funds from the ﬁrst birth subsidy to the promotion of education and health,
without a loss of eﬃciency in birth control. However, a polemical interpretation of my results
10Once again, I focus on linear taxation. I do not deal with health as a pure public good. Doing so would
make less plausible that taxing health expenditure is optimal.
5indicate that, if the Chinese optimal fertility rate is closed but inferior to two children per
family, then the Chinese government policy that consists in taxing births and providing weak
public spending on education is optimal.
Sub-Saharan African countries have implemented several family planning programs that
strongly promote investment in health and education. However, a recent report from the
World Bank [2007] shows that these programs have been ineﬃcient in reducing the net
fertility rate in a large majority of these countries. This paper demonstrates that one reason
why these policies have been ineﬃcient could lie in the fact that they did not increase the
relative cost of quantity. It shows that more attention should be paid to the implementation
of a ﬁscal scheme that would explicitly sanction births.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I present the contributions of
the present paper to the existing literature. In section 3, the benchmark model is presented.
Its recommendations in terms of family policies are discussed. I show that my main results
are robust to the adoption of alternative standard models of endogenous fertility. In section
4, I introduce endogenous child mortality and public health. Section 5 discusses the paper’s
empirical implications for China and Sub-Saharan Africa, and section 6 provides concluding
remarks.
2 Contribution to the Existing Literature
My aim is to determine the tax-transfer policy that will decentralize the ﬁrst-best social
optimum. Such an exercise is very typical in the public economics literature, and it consists
of determining the distortions that ensure that decentralized individual decisions will lead
to the social optimum. In the present framework, I apply this standard methodology to
a non-standard problem. Indeed, quality and quantity of children are special goods that
cannot be exchanged on a market.11,12
11Following Boulding [1964], a recent paper by De la Croix and Gosseries [2007] relaxes this assumption
by assuming the existence of a market of procreation rights that can be exchanged. It ﬁnally consists in a
system of tax or allowance on the quantity of children. They do not investigate, however, the reasons why
governments are not satisﬁed with their national fertility. Then, the present paper can be considered as a
complement to this literature.
12I assume that the government can observe the agent’s behaviors and expectations, it allows to decentralize
the ﬁrst best social optimum. This assumption is strong but fundamental because it shows that the standard
problem of trade-oﬀ between quality and quantity (externalities on human capital and non linearity of
6Eckstein and Wolpin [1985] paved the way in exploring the optimality of fertility behaviors
in a model where parents face a trade-oﬀ between quantity and quality. They assume a non-
dynastic utility function, wherein parents value the number of their children and their future
consumption. Considering Diamond’s growth model with endogenous fertility, they show
that, at the laissez-faire equilibrium, stationary fertility is lower than the fertility rate that
maximizes welfare at the steady state. This result arises because parents do not take into
account the impact of their fertility on the stationary interest rate.
Another foundational paper comes from Nerlove et al [1982], who explore the optimality
of fertility rates in an economy where parents are altruistic and characterized by perfect
foresight. They show that the choice of diﬀerent SWF lead to an alternative judgment
about the competitive fertility rate. Indeed, using a Benthamite SWF implies that the
competitive fertility rate is lower than optimal while using a Millian SWF can imply a
competitive fertility rate that is either lower or higher than optimal. Finally, the Benthamite
SWF always leads to a higher optimal fertility rate than the Millian SWF.13,14
The present paper extends the contributions of these earlier papers by focusing on the
maximization of welfare across dynamics instead of only at a steady state. Then, I determine
an economic policy that decentralizes the ﬁrst-best path. Both Eckstein & Wolpin and
Nerlove et al, conclude that competitive fertility has to be corrected by economic policies
because of the existence of externalities on fertility choices. In this paper, even if there is no
externality on quantity, the existence of externalities on human capital accumulation (quality
of children) implies that it is optimal to tax or subsidize births in addition to subsidizing
education. I also show that this result remains valid in both altruistic and non-altruistic
models.
Golosov et al [2007] explore the optimality of fertility rates in a Barro-Becker model
the parental budget constraint) structurally generates non-optimal laissez faire equilibria regarding both
education and fertility choices. Adding alternative externalities on fertility or studying second order optima
will interestingly contrast this result.
13Spiegel [1993] extends the Nerlove et al’s framework to Rawlsian social preferences. He shows that a
poll tax on births enables the government to decentralize the social optimum of the economy.
14An alternative literature explores the problem of optimal fertility rates with models of endogenous
fertility where the quality of children is exogenous. See for instance, Groezen et al. [2003] and Loupias &
Wigniolle [2004]. Another recent literature is interested in the determination of optimal family policies in
a framework where there exist some constraints on the feasible set of economic policy. See for instance,
Balestrino et al [2000] and Cigno & Pettini [2002].
7[1988] using their notions of A and P eﬃciency that I will present in more detail in the core
of the paper. They show that, when there exist external eﬀects that are conﬁned inside the
family, perfect altruism implies that ”the time series of populations [...] is optimal.” It has
to be noticed that such a result would be diﬀerent if the set of externalities that is explored
were to include technological externalities, such as learning by doing. In the present paper,
the existence of dynastic altruism will not prevent the competitive population growth rate
to diﬀer from the optimal one because external eﬀects are not conﬁned to the family.
3 The Benchmark model
Since the seminal approach from Becker et al [1973,1974,1988], standard models of fertility
assume that parents maximize their utility depending on their own consumption, the quantity
of their children and their quality, subject to a non-linear budget constraint. Authors have
proposed a variety of methods to model this problem. In this section, I focus on the model
of Razin & Ben-Zion [1975] where children’s education is provided inside the family and
parental utility is dynastic. As shown by Nerlove & Rault [1997], the models of Razin &
Ben Zion [1975] and Barro & Becker [1988] both are speciﬁcations of a more general model.
Jones & Schoonbroodt [2009] and Bar & Leukhina [2010] even show that for some parameter
restrictions, they are identical. In Section 3, I will show that my fundamental results are
validated for alternative utility functions (especially for the Rational Altruism of Barro &
Becker and non-dynastic preferences as used in Uniﬁed Growth models). I will also show that
when education is not provided by parents, but by teachers, as in the work of De la Croix &
Doepke [2003], education becomes a source of both positive and negative externalities and,
as a result, it can be the case that private education spending has to be taxed.
3.1 The Competitive Equilibrium
The model consists of an overlapping generations economy with Lt adult agents who live for
two periods: childhood and adulthood. Children receive education from their parent and
do not consume commodities. This education investment is denoted et and consists of a
8schooling time directly provided by the parent.15 It improves the children’s future human
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Function l is strictly increasing and concave with respect to all its arguments. This pro-
duction function of human capital is closed to this used in De la Croix & Doepke [2003].
I assume non-increasing return to scale. There is an intra-family transmission of human
capital: the human capital of parents ht positively inﬂuences the future human capital of
children. It can be understood as a quality eﬀect of the schooling time. Moreover, I assume
the existence of a Lucas-type aggregate externality: the average level of human capital in
the population ht has a positive impact on children’s future human capital.17 Thus, parents
do not take into account that their children’s human capital aﬀects the production function
of other people’s grandchildren. Notice that, following equation (1),e t can be expressed as





1 > 0,e ￿
2 < 0,e ￿
3 < 0.
When a child born at t − 1 becomes an adult, he has to choose his consumption level
Ct, the number of his children Nt and their education et. For simplicity, families are mono-







wthtXt + θwthtΩ(Xt) · et = wtht (2)
where Xt ≡ ξNt denotes the number of surviving children at the end of period t and ξ ∈]0,1[
the fraction of children who survive to age ﬁve. ξ is exogenous in this section, but will be
endogenized hereafter. There is no uncertainty about the reproductive success of a family.18
Each child born takes a part σ ∈ ]0,1[ of its parent’s time endowment that is normalized to
one. Moreover, each surviving child consumes an extra part φ of this time.19 So the cost of
15Providing education is the unique way to transmit wealth to children. There is no ﬁnancial bequest
contrary to Barro & Becker [1988] and Eckstein & Wolpin [1985] for instance.
16Notice that for all function Γ(α1,α 2,....,α n,....), Γ￿
n represents the partial derivative of Γ with regard to
αn.
17This assumption is in line with Lucas [1988] and De la Croix & Doepke [2003].
18So, unlike the models of Sah [1991] and Kalemli-Ozcan [2003] which assume uncertainty, parents will not
overshoot their number of children to ensure the compliance of their optimal fertility rate. See Baudin [2010]
for a complete discussion on the necessary conditions leading to undershooting rather than overshooting.
Here, because child death is assumed to occur before age ﬁve, parents can rapidly ensure the replacement of
dead children.
19Note that σ
ξ + φ<1.θ>0 is a scalar that allows the relative education costs to vary.
9a surviving child is greater than the cost of a non surviving child. The opportunity cost of





wthtXt, where wt denotes the wage per unit of eﬃcient work.
This total cost of quantity includes the ineﬀective costs engaged for non-surviving children.
Consequently, it is negatively dependent on the child survival rate.
The cost of one unit of education is not aﬀected by variations in the child mortality
rate. Indeed, no educational investment is engaged until a child reaches age ﬁve. The total
cost of education is concave in Xt; one unit of education can beneﬁt more than one child.
θwthtΩ(Xt)·et is the cost of giving et units of education to Xt children with 1 ≥ Ω￿(Xt) ≥ 0
and Ω￿￿(Xt) ≤ 0.20 If education is a pure public good inside the family (Ω(Xt) = 1), providing
et units of education to one child implies the same cost as providing et units to Xt children.
If education is a pure private good inside the family (Ω(Xt)=Xt) , one unit of education
beneﬁts only one child.
The price of the ﬁnal good is normalized to one. It is produced in quantity Yt, following
linear technology:
Yt = AHt (3)
where A is a productivity factor and Ht is the total amount of human capital in the workforce.












The workforce participation of parents consist in their remaining time after childbearing and
educating their children. Furthermore, as the labor market is competitive, the wage equals
the workers’ marginal productivity:
wt = A (5)
As in Razin & Ben-Zion [1975], the utility of an agent born in t−1, with perfect foresight,21
20As shown by Willis [1973], because the cost of education are less intensive in parental time, an increase
in the parental income implies a substitution of quality to quantity. Ω￿ (Xt) ≤ 1 ensures the existence of
scales economies in childrearing.
21I assume that agents formulate perfect expectations in order to ease the resolution of the problem.
However, assuming alternative expectations would not alter my main results given that the Social Planner
can perfectly observe private expectations.
10is represented as:22
Vt = max{u(Ct,X t)+βVt+1} (6)
where u(.,.) is strictly increasing and concave in its arguments and lim
Ψt→0
u￿
Ψt =+ ∞ for
Ψt = {Ct,X t}. Vt denotes the maximal utility of an adult born in t − 1. His current utility
depends on his own consumption and the number of his surviving children Xt. I assume
that parents value the number of surviving children and not the number of children born.
This implies that child mortality is a source of disutility. Parental altruism is dynastic, each
agent values his children’s discounted welfare per capita. β denotes the parental discount
rate. I assume a dynastic utility function because it equalizes the maximization horizon of
both individuals and the SociaI Planner. If I had chosen to assume non-altruistic preferences
like in Becker & Tomes or in Uniﬁed Growth models, I would have to either focus on the
stationary solutions to the problem or to assume the existence of an ad hoc social discount
rate introducing artiﬁcial dynamics ineﬃciencies. I discuss this problem in the next section.
Iterating (6) to t =+ ∞, I obtain the equivalence with the centralized problem23 where







s−tu(Cs,X s)( 7 )
A parent born in t − 1 determines his optimal demands (C∗
t ,X∗
t ,e ∗
t) by maximizing Vt with
respect to Lt+1 and ht+1
24 subject to (1),(2) and the deﬁnition
Lt+1
Lt = Xt. I obtain the
following ﬁrst order conditions with respect to Lt+1 and ht+1:25
22Notice that, as mentionned by Nerlove and Rault [1997], this utility function is additively separable and
so, consists in a speciﬁc case of Vt = V (Ct,X t,V t+1).
23A necessary condition to obtain such an equivalence is: limT→+∞ βTU (CT,X T)=0 .X t being the
number of surviving children, it is bounded by 1
σ
ξ +φ the maximal number of children a wife can give birth to.
So, this condition will always be satisﬁed when income and so consumption are bounded at the steady state.
If the economy reaches a balanced growth path where consumption grows at a constant rate, the previous
condition has to be assumed what is the case for the rest of the paper.
24Note that, ht+1 depends on the family’s human capital, the average human capital and the educational
choices of parents. As parents know the level of ht and ht when they determine et; choosing et is equivalent
to choosing ht+1. The same reasoning does apply to Xt. Then, I solve the problem by maximizing with
respect to state variables as proposed by Challier & Michel [1996].





































































t=0 , satisfying equations {(1) − (5),(8),(9)}
t=+∞
t=0 . The
presence of externalities makes private choices on education ineﬃcient. Parents do not
consider the positive eﬀect of their educational investment on the overall eﬃciency of human
capital accumulation. It follows that the competitive equilibrium cannot correspond to
the social optimum. The next sub-sections derive the social optimum of the economy and
compare it to the competitive equilibrium.
3.2 The Social Optimum
Deﬁning the social optimum when the size of population is endogenous demands a discussion
of two concepts: optimality and social welfare. When the size of the population is endoge-
nous, comparing two equilibria requires comparing two situations in which the number of
agents is diﬀerent. This makes the use of the standard concept of Pareto eﬃciency inade-
quate. Golosov et al [2007] propose the A and P eﬃciency concepts. With the A-eﬃciency
concept, one equilibrium dominates another if it is preferred by all the agents who live in
the two equilibria. With the P-eﬃciency concept, agents who are not born are characterized
by well-deﬁned preferences, so an equilibrium dominates if it is preferred by all the agents
who could be born in the two equilibria. In other words, agents who are not born in the
dominant equilibrium but would be born in the other eﬀectively prefer not to be born.26 As
shown by Golosov et al, following the concept of eﬃciency that is chosen, the ranking of
26Blackorby et al [2005] investigate the concept of critical levels of utility which, if ”enjoyed by an added
person without changing the utilities of the existing population, leads to an alternative which is as good as
the original”. One major issue of this literature lies in the choice of critical levels.
12equilibria can diﬀer.27 In this paper, I focus on maximizing the utility of current generations
but I will show that social optimums do not necessary dominate competitive equilibria in
the sense of A-eﬃciency.
As mentioned in the introduction, another critical point lies in the choice of a welfare
function. In the literature, two functions are usually opposed: the Millian SWF correspond-
ing to the utility of the representative agent, and the Benthamite SWF corresponding to
the total utility in the economy.28 In this paper, I propose a formulation of the SWF that





tf (Lt)u(Ct,X t)( 1 0 )
where f￿ (Lt) ≥ 0 and u(Ct,X t) > 0 ∀(Ct,X t) > (0,0).29 f(Lt) denotes the social preference
for the population stock. Because f￿ (Lt) is strictly positive, for a ﬁxed per capita utility level
u, the Social Planner prefers larger populations.30 Notice that, when f (Lt)=Lt, the Social
27Michel & Wigniolle [2008] propose the concepts of RC-Eﬃciency and CRC-Eﬃciency that reﬁne A-
Eﬃciency. With the RC-Eﬃciency concept, an equilibrium dominates another if it is not possible to improve
the situation of a generation without reducing the utility of at least another generation what is equivalent
to A-Eﬃciency with homogenous agents. With the CRC-Eﬃciency, an equilibrium dominates another if it
improves the utility of one generation without reducing the utlity and the size of other generations. Conde-
Ruiz et al [2004] propose the concept u-Eﬃciency that adapts P-eﬃency to models where number of children
is continuous.
28A large set of papers dealing with optimality in endogenous fertility models attribute a Millian objective
to the Social Planner. In this representation, the social planner tries to maximize the utility of the represen-
tative agent at the steady state.S e eG r o e z e net al. [2003], Loupias & Wigniolle [2004], Zhang [2003], Zhang
& Zhang [2007], etc. Notice that, contrary to Spiegel [1993], I do not deal with Rawlsian objectives.
29Following Jones & Schoonbroodt [2007,2009], the case where u(Ct,X t) < 0 ∀(Ct,X t) > (0,0) and
f￿ (Lt) < 0 also makes sense and has to be fully analyzed. This is done in Appendix B. Notice that the main
results of the paper are not changed.
30It also means that the social beneﬁt of increasing the fertility of one generation leaving other generations’



























However, this doesn’t mean that increasing the size of one generation, let’s say Lt, keeping the size of other














To increase Lt keeping Lt+1 constant, Xt−1 has to increase while Xt has to decrease. The global eﬀect of
such a change crucially depends on the way the Social Planner evaluates the welfare of generations born in
t − 2 and t − 1.
13Welfare function is Benthamite, whereas when f (Lt)=1 , it is Millian. For tractability












> 0, F(1) = 1 and F(·) being twice
diﬀerentiable.31 To ensure that the Social Welfare Function (SWF) is bounded, I assume
lim
T→+∞
βTf (LT)=0 .32 I also assume that there is no asymmetric information such that the
Social Planner can observe all parental preferences, constraints, abilities and expectations.
The resource constraint of the economy implies that, at each date, total production equals









Xt + θΩ(Xt) · et
￿
Lt (13)





t=0 . The social optimum is deﬁned by the set
￿
￿ Ct, ￿ Xt,￿ et,￿ ht,￿ ht+1,





t=0 and, at each date t, both following




























































g denotes the elasticity of g with respect to v.Obviously, at the social optimum,
all of the existing externalities are taken into account. In this economy, there exist two types
of externality: (i) a Lucas-type externality in the accumulation of human capital and (ii)
when f￿ (Lt) is strictly positive, parental preferences diﬀer from the preferences of the Social
Planner since parents do not value the population stock.34
31An intuitive formulation of f (Lt) consists in the Cobb-Douglas case such that f (Lt)=L
1−κ
t with
κ ∈ [0,1]. If κ = 0, the objective function is Benthamite and, if κ = 1, it is Millian.









=0 . Because fertility is bounded by the maximal




















ensures that SWF is bounded whatever κ ∈ [0,1].
33To ensure global concavity of the problem, its Hessian matrix is assumed to be negative semi-deﬁnite.
34This is also the case when u(Ct,X t) < 0 and f￿
Lt < 0. See Appendix B.
143.3 The Optimal Tax-Transfer Policy
In order to decentralize the social optimum, the government has to implement a public policy











t=0 coincide with the
social optimum
￿




In this section, I discuss the optimal tax-transfer policies in the Millian case where
f￿ (Lt) = 0 and in the more general case where f￿ (Lt) > 0. In the Millian case, the only
externality is the Lucas-type externality on human capital accumulation that makes parents
undervalue the return on their investment in children’s human capital. There is no diﬀerence
between social and private preferences. It therefore seems intuitive that the implementation
of a subsidy on education ﬁnanced by a lump tax would ensure the decentralization of the so-
cial optimum. However, one major result of this paper is that this policy cannot decentralize
the ﬁrst-best equilibrium. Indeed, because the budget constraint is not linear, subsidizing
education spending reduces the total cost of children, so an additional tax on child births is
needed.
In the non-Millian case, in addition to the Lucas-type externality on education, there
exists an externality on fertility. The optimal policy will consist of a tax-transfers policy on
education and births completed by a lump-sum transfer as in the Millian case, but such a
policy does not necessarily consist of taxing births and subsidizing education. The social
preference for the population stock enriches the model with two mechanisms. First, when
adults decide their number of children, they do not take into account that they make it
easier to attain a greater population size in the future, which is socially desirable since it
will increase the total utility of society. Second, if Lt+1 >L t, transferring welfare from
current to future generations would be socially desirable because it would beneﬁt a larger
population.35 In other words, the social returns on education investments would be greater
35This mechanism can also be understood in the light of a comparison between private and social prefer-
ences for present. Indeed, at period t, equation (7) indicates that in t =0 , the per se private welfare gain of
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C0 + βF (X1)u￿
C1 + β2F (X1X2)u￿















is higher than the private one (βt). Then the social returns of education are
15than the private ones even if the Lucas-type externality did not exist. However, if Lt+1 <L t,
it is socially desirable to transfer utility from future to present generations. To summarize,
the Social Planner prefers transferring utility to the generations with the greatest population.
The optimal tax-transfer policy will result from the opposition of the two externalities of the
model.
Let the set {λt,Λt,T t}
t=+∞
t=0 deﬁne an economic policy where λt > 0( r e s pλt < 0) consists
of the subsidy rate (resp tax rate) on education spending, Λt > 0( r e s pΛ t < 0) denotes the
tax (resp subsidy) on each birth and Tt ￿ 0 the lump-sum transfer. At each date t, the






























wthtXt +( 1− λt)θwthtΩ(Xt) · et = wtht + Tt (17)















t=0 and the following ﬁrst order conditions









































Since (16) and (17) ensure that the resources constraint is satisﬁed, it is straightforward





Proposition 1 Given the parental (perfect) expectations on {λt+1,Λt+1,T t+1}
t=+∞
t=0 , there
exists a unique vector {λt,Λt,T t}
t=+∞
t=0 that is able to decentralize the ﬁrst-best path. Given
that ￿ Tt is directly deduced from the government budget constraint the optimal economic policy
is fully described as follows:
￿ λt = −at￿ λt+1 + bt￿ Λt+1 + dt [F (Xt) − 1] − gt
￿ Λt = −it￿ λt+1 + jt￿ Λt+1 − kt [F (Xt) − 1] − mt
higher than the private one even if they would not exist any externality on education investments.
16Proof. See Appendix A.
It appears that once the Social Planner observes the parental expectations on the future
values of the instruments, it is always possible to deﬁne a unique optimal economic policy.
At the steady state, the optimal economic policy is described by the set
￿










































































In the following sub-sections, I interpret this result at the steady state in the simple case of
a Millian SWF and in the general case where the SWF is not Millian.
3.3.1 The Millian Case: f￿ (Lt)=0
In the Millian case, there is no diﬀerence between individual and social preferences. At the
steady state, the optimal economic policy is described as follows:


































The non increasing return to scale in human capital accumulation and εΩ
X < 1 implies that
￿ λ>0,
b Λ
ξ > 0 and ￿ T>0.36 Because of the Lucas-type externality, parents do not internalize
all the returns on their investment in education. Then, at the competitive equilibrium, their
investment in children’s human capital is smaller than at the optimum. Thus, a subsidy on
private education spending has to be implemented. Such a subsidy decreases the marginal







Xt ·et. Thus, parents give births to too







1, what implies that ε
ht+1































> 0. Furthermore, by deﬁnition, εΩ





β + εb e
2 − εΩ
b X > 0. As εb e
3 < 0, it follows that ￿ λ>0,
b Λ
ξ > 0 and ￿ T>0.
17many children at the competitive equilibrium, and a tax on each birth has to be implemented





wtht +( 1− λ)θwthtΩ￿
Xtet.37
Therefore, to decentralize the ﬁrst-best optimum, the government has to implement a tax
on births in addition to the education policy despite the fact that the quantity of children
is not a source of externalities. In other words, because of the fundamental non-linearity of
the quality-quantity costs structure, three instruments are needed to correct the Lucas-type
externality.38
Notice that the ﬁrst-best optimum dominates all other equilibria in the sense of A, RC,
CRC-eﬃciency. Indeed, it is impossible to improve the welfare of one generation of living
agents without reducing the welfare of another generation of living agents. In that case, the
social optimum necessarily dominates the competitive equilibrium. Notice that this result
crucially comes from the absence of distance between social and private preferences.
3.3.2 The General Case, f￿(Lt) > 0
When f￿ (Lt) > 0, there exists a diﬀerence between individual and social preferences.
Indeed, the Social Planner has a preference for the population stock though it is not a
concern of individuals. Formally, the optimal tax transfer policy is described by equations








































































The impact of the Lucas-type externality remains the same. The social preference for the size
37As shown by Willis [1973], facing a decrease in the cost of quality, parents can also reduce their fertility
rate. In the present case, this can mean, for instance, that the quantity of children is a Giﬀen good. Indeed,
after a decrease in the price of quantity (through the subsidy on education), its ”consumption” decreases.
Nevertheless, in this case, the optimal economic policy still consists in taxing births to incite parents to make
more children.
38When education is a pure public good inside the family (Ω￿
Xt = 0), taxing births is never necessary
to decentralize the ﬁrst best path. Indeed, education has still to be subsidized but the marginal cost of
childbearing does no more depend on the educational investment.
18of populations introduces two additional eﬀects. First, the Social Planner prefers the largest
generations (for example, distributing one unit of utility per se to a large generation is more
enjoyable than distributing one unit of utility to a smaller generation). Thus, when ￿ X>1
(increasing population), it is optimal to transfer welfare from present to future generations.39
To do so, educational investments of present generations have to be increased. In other
words, the social returns on parental investments in education is higher than the private
returns because it will beneﬁt a growing population. This mechanism has a positive eﬀect
on the optimal value of the subsidy on education (RHSλ > 0). Because the parental budget
constraint is non-linear, it has also a positive impact on the optimal tax rate on births
(RHSΛ > 0). In contrast, if the optimal population growth rate is negative ( ￿ X<1), it is
socially enjoyable to transfer welfare from future to present generations, which necessitates
limiting the parental investment in education. This has a negative impact on both ￿ λ and ￿ Λ
ξ
((RHSλ,RHS Λ) < (0,0)).
The second eﬀect introduced by the existence of a social preference for the size of the
population is more straightforward. When deciding their fertility rate, individuals do not
take the social preference for the population stock into account.40 Individuals therefore
underestimate the returns on their investment on childbearing. Ceteris paribus, their fertility
rate is too low, which has a negative impact on both ￿ λ and ￿ Λ
ξ ((LHSλ,LHS Λ) < (0,0)).41
This mechanism has a negative impact on ￿ Λ
ξ (and on ￿ λ because of the non linearity of the
parental budget constraint).
As a result, the optimal tax transfer policy consists of subsidizing education and taxing
births as in the Millian case only if the Lucas-type externality is strong relative to the prefer-










It has to be noticed that when f￿ (Lt) > 0, the social optimum does not necessarily dom-
inates the laissez-faire equilibrium in the sense of A, RC, CRC, P and u eﬃciency. Indeed,
when the two objectives diﬀer, nothing ensures that all living agents in the two equilibria
39When f￿
Lt is negative, this eﬀect is partially reversed. Nevertheless, Proposition 1 and equations (23)
and (24) remain valid when f￿
Lt < 0 and u(Ct,X t) < 0.
40Agents do not take into acount that when they give birth to a child, they make it easier for future
generations to reach larger population size what is socially enjoyable.
41It is straightforward that (LHSλ,LHS Λ) < (0,0) because, to ensure that the Social Planner’s objective
is bounded, the model assumes that βF (max{X}) < 1.
19enjoy a higher welfare at the optimum. Because of the social preference for the population
stock, it can be socially enjoyable to give birth to a higher number of agents who receive
less welfare than at the laissez-faire (this will be the case when the externality on education
investment is weak relative to the social preference for the size of population). Thus, in this
sense, the social optimum does not necessarily dominate the laissez-faire equilibrium in the
sense of A, RC and CRC-eﬃciency. Then, because nothing ensures that, for all conﬁgura-
tion of the model, the social optimum dominates the competitive equilibrium in the sense of
A-eﬃciency, nothing can ensure such a domination in the sense of P-eﬃciency.42
In this section, I ﬁnd two important results. First, in the standard model of endogenous
fertility, when there is no diﬀerence between private and social preferences, positive external-
ities on the human capital accumulation process mean that subsidizing education spending
is optimal (like in the usual literature) but has to be combined with a tax on each birth.
This result comes from the decrease in the marginal cost of quantity induced by education
subsidies. Second, when the Social planner is not Millian, despite the fact that education
is a source of only positive externalities, subsidizing education is not always optimal. This
result comes from the social preference for large generations that distorts the returns to
investments in education relative to the returns to investment in the quantity of children.
In the next section, I answer a natural question: ”Do the previous results still prevail if
I adopt another standard model of fertility?”
4 Alternative ”standard” models of endogenous fertil-
ity
At least two alternative models could also be considered as standard models of endogenous
fertility: the Barro-Becker type model [1988] and the non-altruistic model. I show that
adopting these models does not change my main results. I also show that adopting the De
la Croix & Doepke’s assumption that education is not provided by parents but by teachers
can deeply change the nature of the optimal economic policy in the Millian case.
42In this paper, unborn agents are not characterized by well-deﬁned preferences.
204.1 The Dynastic Altruism of Barro and Becker
Becker & Barro [1988] propose a model of fertility where the parental utility function consists
of the discounted sum of their dynasty’s ﬂow of utility. Parental altruism is endogenous
and negatively related to the quantity of children and the current utility of parents is not
inﬂuenced by their fertility. In such a case, Vt = max{U (Ct)+β (Xt)XtVt+1} with β (Xt)=
βX
−ε
t . Starting in period t = 0 and normalizing the initial adults to L0 = 1, sequential







t U (Ct)( 2 5 )
where U (·) is strictly increasing and concave in Ct. Following Jones & Schoonbroodt
[2007,2009], I assume that: (i) ε ∈]0,1[ when U(Ct) > 0 ∀Ct > 0 while, (ii) ε>1 when
U(Ct) < 0 ∀(Ct) > (0,0).
I did not adopt this utility function in my benchmark model. However, as mentioned by
Nerlove and Rault [1997], the Barro and Becker’s model, as well as the model designed by
Razin and Ben Zion, are speciﬁc cases of a more general model.44 In this section, I don’t
assume the existence of a pro-natalist bias: f(Lt)=1∀Lt.45 Therefore, W0 = V0.
The Barro and Becker model does not introduce any additional externality compared
to the model of Razin and Ben Zion. The only diﬀerence between the two comes from the
formulation of individual utility functions. It is therefore intuitive that the two models lead
to the same conclusions in term of optimal economic policy. The proof of this result is
provided in Appendix C.
4.2 Non Altruistic Model
Recent literature pertaining to the UGT has favored the use of fertility models where parental
utility is not dynastic. In other words, parents exhibit imperfect altruism and the quality
43See Becker and Barro [1988].
44Nerlove & Rault [1997] present this more general model where Vt = max{u(Ct,X t)+β (Xt)XtVt+1}.
In the Becker and Barro speciﬁcation, u￿
Xt = 0 while in the Razin and Ben Zion model, Xtβ (Xt)=β. Jones
& Schoonbroodt [2009] and Bar & Leukhina [2010] show that for some joint restrictions on ε and u(Ct),
both models are identical. Jones & Schoonbroodt [2007] provide an enlightening study of the relationship
between fertility and income in the model of Barro and Becker.
45Adding such a natalist bias would be redundant especially thinking to f(Lt)=Lκ
t . Furthermore, it is
intuitive that the eﬀect of such a bias would be identical to this studied in the Benchmark model.
21of children directly enters their utility function. This quality can take the form of human
capital (see Galor [2005]), ﬁnancial bequest (see Becker and Lewis [1973]), health status,
etc. Parental utility can be represented by U (Ct,X t,h t+1), which is increasing and strictly
concave with respect to all its arguments. Adopting this non-dynastic representation of
preferences makes it diﬃcult to properly deﬁne a SWF. In this sub-section, I adopt the
method of Eckstein and Wolpin [1985] by deﬁning the SWF as the utility of the current
generation at the steady state. I determine the optimal economic policy that allows the
decentralization of the set of optimal behaviors at the steady state. Another alternative could
consist of deﬁning an ad-hoc social discount rate and assuming a dynastic Social Planner.
However, in that case, the model introduces artiﬁcial positive externalities on fertility and
education choices: parents do not take the dynamic returns on their investments into account.
The stationary Millian SWF is W = U (C,X,h). It is maximized with respect to C,X,h


















At the stationary competitive equilibrium, agents maximize V = U (C,X,h) with respect







whX + θwhΩ(X) · e = wh
There is no diﬀerence between individual and social preferences and a Lucas-type ex-
ternality exists, as in the Benchmark model. An additional intradynastic externality is
introduced in this model. Indeed, because parents do not care about the future well-being
of their children, when they decide their optimal investment in education, they do not take
into account that: (i) they increase their children’s future earning abilities wt+1ht+1,( ii)
they reduce the cost of producing the human capital of their grandchildren in the sense that




, their children will need to invest a smaller et+1,
and (iii) they increase the opportunity cost of grandchildren relative to the opportunity cost
of providing them with education; indeed the quantity of children is more time-consuming
22than children’s quality. The addition of this positive intra-dynastic externality on human
capital dramatically reinforces the results of Section 1 in the Millian case.
Formally, the optimal economic policy becomes:46
￿ λ =
b C











































> (0,0). Finally, it appears that considering dynastic
or non-dynastic altruism leads to the same fundamental result: in a Millian economy, in the
presence of positive externalities in the accumulation of human capital, an optimal economic
policy has to subsidize education and has to tax births. However, in the non altruistic model,
nothing can ensure that the economic policy that is optimal at the steady state will also be
optimal out of the steady state.
4.3 When education is provided by teachers
De la Croix and Doepke [2003] assume that education is not provided by parents but by
teachers. Parents ﬁnance a schooling time et, the process of accumulation of human capital
remains unchanged and the average human capital in the school system is the same as in the
whole economy. However, the parental budget constraint and the aggregate human capital



















The cost of educating children is no longer an opportunity cost, but a ﬁnancial cost. The
workforce participation of parents consists in their remaining time after childbearing, and
teachers do not directly participate in the production of the ﬁnal good.
For simplicity, I assume that the SWF is Millian. In addition to simplifying the results in
a sensible manner, it is intuitive that assuming a non-Millian Social Planner would result in
the existence of a preference for larger generations, as in the Benchmark model. Formally,
46Both the stationary competitive equilibrium and the stationary optimum are displayed in appendix E.





















As in the Benchmark model, parents do not internalize the impact of their investment in
human capital at the level of the future average of human capital in the entire population.
Thus, they do not consider that, when they invest in their children’s human capital, they
improve the quality of the school system and so ease the future accumulation of human
capital in their dynasty (quality eﬀect). But they also do not take into account that this will
in turn increase the cost of future investments in education: indeed, the rise in the average
level of teachers’ human capital triggers the cost of ﬁnancing one unit of education (cost
eﬀect). This eﬀect is an intra-dynastic negative externality and it can lead to a too high
investment in human capital at the competitive equilibrium. The optimal economic policy
on education will consist of a tax on education spending when the cost eﬀect is stronger
than the quality eﬀect (
￿ ￿εb e
3
￿ ￿ > 1).48 Following De la Croix and Doepke [2003], this condition
holds in empirical data. Because no externality exists on fertility, the non-linearity of the
parental budget constraint implies that births must be subsidized.
This result highlights that the consideration of the dynamic properties of the standard
model of fertility throws into question the common results of education models which do not
consider endogenous fertility. It also appears that introducing, in the benchmark model, a
mixed education system with both parents and teachers provides richer results. Indeed, even
in the Millian case, it can be optimal to tax education and subsidize births despite education
being a source of positive externalities.
In the following section, the benchmark model is extended to include endogenous child
mortality and private health expenditure. Despite the changes in the nature of the trade-oﬀ
between quality and quantity, the need to tax births will not be canceled by the introduction
of a health expenditure.
47See Appendix E for a complete description of the competitive equilibrium, the ﬁrst best path and the
economic policy that allows to decentralize this latter.
48By (1), this will be satisﬁed when the elasticity of ht+1 with respect to et is greater than the elasticity




β > 1, εb e
2 < 0 and εΩ






b X < 0.
245 Optimal Tax-Transfer policy with health expendi-
ture
The child survival rate is currently endogenous. Parents can use health expenditure to
reduce their children’s probability of dying. In line with Chakraborty [2004], the child
survival probability ξt is now:
ξt ≡ ξ (st,st)( 3 1 )
Parental expenditure on health has a strictly positive and concave inﬂuence on children’s
survival probability, so ξ￿
1 ≡
∂ξ(st,st)




t < 0. This expenditure represents
the health care provided by parents to children. Parental health care covers a large set of
expenditures such as hygiene, sanitation improvements and eﬃcient nutrition. st denotes








The introduction of an externality on health expenditure implies that the parental choices
on st will not be eﬃcient at the competitive equilibrium. Intuitively, one can expect that
the competitive level of health expenditure will be inferior to its optimal level. However, the
existence of educational ineﬃciency could alter this result because, as previously shown, it
decreases the total cost of quantity.
5.1 The Competitive Equilibrium
Parents now have to determine the amount of health expenditure for their children. In
other words, they choose Xt and st. The addition of an externality on health spending
implies that private health investment will not be optimal. Assume that the government
introduces a subsidy rt on health expenditure in accordance with the previous ﬁscal system.
The government budget constraint, for each date t, is now:
Tt = λtθe(ht+1,h t,h t)Ω(Xt)wtht −
Λtwtht
ξ (st,st)
Xt + rtst (32)
When the ﬁscal scheme is implemented, the familial budget constraint, at date t, is:






wthtXt +( 1− κt)θwthtΩ(Xt) · et = wtht (33)
25The ﬁnal good can now be either consumed or invested in health. Then, a parent born







by maximizing Vt with respect to
Ct,X t, and ht+1 subject to (1) and (33). As health expenditure does not enter the objective
function, parents determine their optimal health expenditure by minimizing (1 − rt)st +
σ+Λt
ξ(st,st)wthtXt. It follows that:













Parents equalize the marginal return and the marginal cost of the health expenditure
1−rt. The marginal beneﬁt of the health expenditure (RHS of (34)) consists of the reduction
in the total cost of quantity.49 In other words, equation (34) determines the optimal parental
spending on health to have Xt surviving children. It also emphasizes that the taxation of
births increases the marginal cost of quantity and increases the marginal beneﬁts of the
health expenditure.
Using the same method as for previous models, I obtain the same ﬁrst order condi-
tions with respect to Lt+1 and ht+1 as in the benchmark model given that at each date
t, the child survival probability equals ξ (st,st) instead of ξ. So, the competitive equilib-
















t=0 given that now ξ = ξ (st,st).
5.2 The Social Optimum
For simplicity’s sake, f(Lt) = 1 is assumed for each t. The Social Planner maximizes a Millian
Social Welfare function W0 =
+∞ ￿
t=0
βtu(Ct,X t). He holds a new maximization instrument st
and faces a new resource constraint at each date t:











At the optimum st = st. The Social Planner determines the optimal health expenditure
by minimizing σ
ξ(st,st)XtAht +st with regard to st. When this is the case, the marginal social
cost of health spending (equal to one) is equal to its marginal return. Obviously, the marginal
49As mentionned in the Benchmark model, a higher child survival rate decreases the cost of quantity.
26social beneﬁt of health spending is higher than the marginal private beneﬁt (calculated in





1 (￿ st, ￿ st)+￿ ξ￿
2 (￿ st, ￿ st)
￿
[ξ (￿ st, ￿ st)]
2 ￿ XtA￿ ht (36)
The optimal equilibrium now results from the maximization of W0 with regard to Lt+1
and ht+1 and subject to {(1),(35),(36)}
t=+∞
t=0 . Then the social optimum is then described
by the set
￿






ξ = ξ (st,st) and f(Lt)=1∀Lt.
5.3 The Optimal Tax-Transfer Policy At The Steady State
Using the same method as in Proposition 1, it is straightforward that there exists a unique
set {λt,Λt,s t,T t}
t=+∞
t=0 that is able to decentralize the ﬁrst-best path. An optimal policy at
the steady state must make identical systems {(14),(15),(36)} and {(8),(9),(34)}. Con-
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Optimal values of ￿ λ and ￿ Λ are the same as in the previous section (given that the optimal
values of ￿ C, ￿ X and ￿ h have changed). This implies that, as in Section 1, a policy of education
and health is optimal when it is combined with a tax-transfer policy on births. Here, because
the Social Planner exhibits no preference for the population stock, the optimal family policy
always consists of a tax on births, a subsidy on education and a tax or a subsidy on health
spending. The government budget constraint still has to be balanced by the implementation
of a lump-sum tax on each family.
Proposition 2 When the externality on the health expenditure is strong such that ε
ξ(s,s)
s > ε,
the optimal health policy consists of a subsidy. In the opposite case, it is optimal to tax health
spending.
Proof. It is straightforward to show that the parental health expenditure is not optimal
at the competitive steady state. At the competitive steady state (without taxation), (34)
27and (8) imply s∗ = ε
ξ(s,s)







σAhN. It follows that s∗ < ￿ s. However s∗ < ￿ s does not ensure that health



































When health externalities are strong with respect to educational externalities (ε
ξ(b s,b s)
s > ε),
the health expenditure has to be subsidized while the opposite is true when (ε
ξ(b s,b s)
s < ε).
This result comes from the non-linearity of the costs structure. Indeed, the existence of an
externality on the health expenditure implies that parents do not internalize all the returns
on their investment in children’s health. The comparison of (34) with Λ = r = 0 and (36)
indicates that the health expenditure at the competitive steady state is lower than at the
optimal steady state. However, when education is subsidized, a tax on births has to be
implemented. When this is the case, the cost of quantity is increased relative to the cost of
health, so parents tend to increase their health expenditure. The tax on births plays the role
of an indirect subsidy on health. Finally, the sign of ￿ r is determined by the diﬀerence between
the intensity of externalities on both health and education investments. If the externality on
health is relatively strong (ε
ξ(b s,b s)
s > ε), the indirect subsidy will not be suﬃcient to reach ￿ s, so
￿ r will be positive. Conversely, if the externality on health is relatively weak (ε
ξ(b s,b s)
s < ε), the
indirect subsidy exceeds the necessary health subsidy. Therefore, ￿ r will be negative meaning
that health expenditure have to be taxed.
To summarize, the present section provides two results. First, in a Millian economy,
whenever it is optimal to subsidize education and health, it is optimal to tax births. Second,
when the social returns on the health expenditure are low relative to the social return on
education expenditure, the optimal family planning program consists of the promotion of
education ﬁnanced by the taxation of health and births and a lump-sum tax. Conversely,
when the social returns on health expenditure are high relative to social returns on education,
28the optimal family planning program consists in the promotion of education and health
ﬁnanced by the taxation of births and a lump-sum tax.50 This optimal policy has, in fact,
two main objectives. The ﬁrst is to modify the parental trade-oﬀ between quality and
quantity by inciting parents to transfer a part of their spending on fertility toward educational
investment. The second objective is to modify the parental trade-oﬀ between fertility and
health. In order to reach the same number of surviving children, parents are incited to invest
less in the quantity of children.
6 Some Empirical Issues At Stake
In this section, I discuss the main theoretical conclusions of the model in the light of some
empirical evidence. I show that these conclusions could enrich the set of family policies
that are implemented in countries facing the problem of overpopulation. It should be clear
that the simplicity of the model does not allow it to reproduce the very complex demo-
graphic puzzles that confront these countries. The discussion is therefore limited to general
statements.
Countries that face over-population problems implement policies to slow their population
growth rate. Two examples are particularly illuminating: China and Sub-Saharan Africa.
Although these two regions both face overpopulation, their family policies have been notice-
ably diﬀerent. This section reﬂects on improvements that could be made to these countries’
policies in light of the ﬁscal scheme proposed in this paper.
A recent report from the World Bank [2007] states that 31 of the 35 countries with the
highest fertility rates are located in Sub-Saharan Africa. For the majority of these countries,
fertility rates remained stable over the last few decades at greater than six children per
woman. However, the vast majority of these countries have implemented family planning
programs in collaboration with international organizations such as the World Bank.
The World Bank’s report [2007] emphasizes that the main factor driving high fertility
rates is the persistent parents desire for a large number of children. In other words, the
too high fertility rates in Sub-Saharan Africa do not result from a lack of family planning
50Following Dasgupta [1993], the social returns on health expenditure are high. Then, the promotion of
education and health ﬁnanced by the taxation of births is a more realistic conclusion.
29programs. The report asserts that eﬀorts must be made to reduce the desired fertility. To
do so, it recommends improving education and health programs at the local level. However,
education indicators have increased since the sixties. Between 1990 and 2006, the net primary
school enrollment rate increased from 50 to 70 percent. In the same period, the youth and
adult literacy rates increased as well.51 This noticeable improvement in education rates has
not been suﬃcient to reduce fertility rates.
The present paper does not recommend increasing spending on family planning programs.
It proposes complementing family planning programs with taxes on births that would ﬁnance
education and health. Without taxing births, these programs reduce the net cost of the
children’s quantity, creating conditions for the number of children desired to remain high.
Obviously, it is unclear whether it is feasible to implement a tax on births in a population
that is largely engaged in an informal economy.52 However, increasing the costs associated
with increases in the quantity of children should be considered as a policy instrument for
family planning.
China also implements family policy to reduce its population growth rate. However, its
strategy diﬀers from family planning programs in Sub-Saharan Africa. Since 1980, China
has implemented the ”One-Child” policy which strongly constrains families’ fertility. It is a
system that provides generous subsidies for the ﬁrst birth and imposes very high taxes on
the subsequent births. If parents decide to have a second child without being permitted to
do so, they lose a large part of their retirement pension, their child care allowance and other
social advantages. Furthermore, some physical sanctions have been implemented in rural
areas. This ﬁscal scheme is diﬀerent from the one proposed in this paper, as the Chinese
policy does not tax all births at the same rate. The ﬁrst birth is subsidized while subsequent
births are heavily taxed.
The high tax on subsequent births is a very eﬃcient incentive to have only one child.
Thus, the large majority of families are subsidized to reach the target of one child per
family making the ”One-Child” Policy very costly. The policy does not produce revenue to
51In Sub-Saharan Africa, the youth literacy rate was 64% in 1990 and 73% in 2006. The adult literacy
rate was 54% in 1990 and 61% in 2006. See Appendix F for a more complete description.
52Furthermore, some of these countries are facing other complex problems such as political instability,
starvation and HIV pandemy that are well beyond the scope of this paper. These problems have a direct
and signiﬁcant eﬀect on fertility and education behaviors.
30ﬁnance education and health policies, so there is nothing to ensure that the relative costs of
education and health will reach their optimal value. Indeed, a large body literature stresses
the insuﬃciency of the public expenditure on health and education in Chinese rural areas
where the large majority of the population is concentrated (for example, see Kanbur & Zhang
[2003] and Fan & Zhang [2000]).
The results of this paper indicate that some marginal changes in the One-Child policy
could improve the overall eﬃciency of Chinese family planning policy. These results suggest
that all births should be taxed to avoid eﬀective costs. The amount saved by the Chinese
government could be invested in more ambitious education and health policies, thereby
reducing the large inequalities between urban and rural areas. Theoretically, this system
would not increase the overall cost of the Chinese family planning program and would lead
to the same fertility rates. It would, however, increase health and education investments.
Furthermore, the Chinese family policy is coercive, while the economic policy proposed in
this paper is non-coercive. If the two policies are equally eﬃcient, the non-coercive policy
should be implemented because it improves welfare.
Note that a ”naive” interpretation of the model could lead to an alternative analysis. The
Chinese government’s objective to reach a fertility rate inferior to two children per family
could reveal that the Chinese optimal population growth rate in the long-run is negative
and that there exists a preference for large generations. Then the policy of low subsidies
on education spending would be optimal because it transfers welfare from future to present
generations.
7 Conclusion
The present paper analyses optimal family policies in the standard model of trade-oﬀ between
quality and quantity. Given the non-linearity of the parental budget constraint, subsidizing
education and health will be optimal if a tax (or a subsidy) on births is also implemented.
Indeed, a subsidy on education reduces both the cost of educational investment and the total
cost of fertility. This result applies for a large set of Social Welfare Functions, including Mil-
lian and Benthamite functions. Obviously, the model concludes that taxing births without
ﬁnancing education and health is also not optimal.
31Finally, the ﬁscal scheme proposed in this model is quite simple: education and health
expenditures are promoted by the taxation of births and lump-sum transfers. This scheme
could improve the overall eﬃciency of family policies currently implemented in China and
Sub-Saharan Africa. The main objective of the present investigation was to explore the
family policy recommendations of the standard endogenous fertility model. As a natural
extension of this work, future research should integrate countries’ speciﬁcities to make quan-
titative proposals for economic policy and to provide a more precise discussion of empirical
evidence.
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t=0 , it appears that the set
{λt,Λt}
t=+∞
t=0 has to ensure that, at each date t, the ﬁrst order conditions with respect to
Lt+1 and ht+1 at the competitive equilibrium is identical to the ﬁrst order condition with
respect to Lt+1 and ht+1 at the optimum. Doing so, I obtain the following system of equations,
given the initial conditions (L0,h 0) > (0,0) and that ∀t, X∗
t = ￿ Xt and h∗


















































































































































































































































Equations (38) and (39) characterize a system of 2 equations with 2 unknowns which
are {λ0,Λ0} given the parental perfect foresight on {λ1,Λ1}. This system is linear with
regards to its unknowns and so, it is straightforward that there exists a unique solution
to this system of equations. I can display {λ0,Λ0} as a linear function of λ1 and Λ1. It is
intuitive that the assumption of perfect foresights does not alter my result because, for any
parental expectation on {λ1,Λ1}, there exist a solution to the sub-system of equations. This
reasoning can be applied at each date t.
So, I can determine ￿ λt and ￿ Λt as the values of λt and Λt making identical equation (18)
to equation (14) and equation (19) to (15) for each date t. I obtain the following result:
￿ λt = −at￿ λt+1 + bt￿ Λt+1 + dt [F (Xt) − 1] − gt













































































































































































To clarify the exposure of results in section 3.2 and 3.3, I have limited the analysis to the
cases where both u(Ct,X t) and f￿
Lt are positive. However, as shown by Jones & Schoonbroodt
[2007] for the model of Barro & Becker [1988], the case where both u(Ct,X t) and f￿
Lt are
negative also makes sense and has to be fully studied. Notice that f￿￿
LtLt > 0 ensures the
concavity of the problem.
In this case, the condition limT→+∞ βTf(LT) = 0 and the properties of f(Lt) imply











It is important to notice that this alternative assumptions don’t change my main results.
It is straightforward that all mathematical results in sub-sections 3.2 and 3.3 are still valid.




































































38Nevertheless, the sign of both RHSΛ and RHSλ are now changed: (i) when X ∈]β
1
κ−1,1[,
(RHSΛ,RHS λ) > (0,0) while (ii) when X>1, (RHSΛ,RHS λ) < (0,0). This can be easily
understood remembering the comparison between private and social preferences for present.
Indeed, equation (7) indicates that in t =0 , the per se private welfare gain of increasing by
one unit the consumption of each generation is u￿
C0 + βu￿
C1 + β2u￿
C2 + .... + βtu￿
Ct + .... while




C1 + β2 f(L2)
f(L0)u￿
Ct+2 +
.... + βt f(Lt)
f(L0)u￿
Ct + .... = u￿
C0 + βF (X1)u￿
C1 + β2F (X1X2)u￿








It follows from the new deﬁnition of F (·) that if population is growing (Xs > 1) the






is smaller than the private one (βt). So, if
population is increasing, the Social Planner wants to transfer utility from future to present
generations. This is done by decreasing the subsidy on education (RHSλ < 0) and be-
cause the parental budget constraint is not linear, it has a negative impact on
b Λ
ξ . How-







>β t ) and so, the Social Planner wants to transfer utility from present to
future generations.
Notice that this eﬀect is a partial one and that all other mechanisms in the model remain
unchanged when both u(Ct,X t) and f￿
Lt are negative. Noticeably, LHSΛ and LHSλ both




For a constant level of consumption in the long-run, the problem is bounded when
limT→+∞ βTL
1−ε
T =0 . I fε<1, the assumption β<(σ
ξ + φ)1−ε ensures that the previ-
ous condition is satisﬁed. However, this is no more the case when ε>1. In this case, the
problem is bounded only if X>β
1
ε−1 ≡ XMIN. The set of feasible equilibria is smaller.
Using the same method as in the Benchmark model, the economic policy that decentral-
izes the ﬁrst-best path is the set {λt,Λt}
t=+∞
t=0 solving the following system of equations at
39each date t:
σ






























































Given the parental (perfect) expectations on {λt+1,Λt+1}
t=+∞
t=0 , there exists a unique
vector {λt,Λt}
t=+∞
t=0 that is able to decentralize the ﬁrst-best path. Given that ￿ Tt is di-
rectly deduced from the government budget constraint, the optimal economic policy is fully
described as follows:
￿ λt = −￿ at￿ λt+1 +￿ bt
b Λt+1





= ￿ it￿ λt+1 +￿ jt
b Λt+1








































































































Proposition 3 (￿ λ∞, ￿ Λ∞) > (0,0)∀ε>0
Proof. Because εΩ





2 > 0. P ￿(X)=
εe
1
β (ε−1)Xε−2. Two cases have to be studied: (i) ε ∈]0,1[
and (ii) ε>1.
Case 1: ε ∈]0,1[
In this case P ￿(X) < 0. So, P(X) reaches its minimum when X = 1
σ





ξ + φ)1−ε + εe
2 > 0a sβ<(σ
ξ + φ)1−ε when ε ∈]0,1[ (see also footnote
(37)).
Therefore, P(X) > 0 ∀X ∈]0,X MAX[. It implies that (￿ λ∞, ￿ Λ∞) > (0,0)∀ε ∈]0,1[.
Case 2: ε>1
Remember that in this case, XMIN = β
1
ε−1. In this case P ￿(X) > 0. So, P(X) reaches
its minimum when X = XMIN. I get that minP(X)=εe
1 + εe
2 > 0 (see footnote (37)).
Therefore, P(X) > 0 ∀X ∈]XMIN,X MAX[. It implies that (￿ λ∞, ￿ Λ∞) > (0,0)∀ε>1.
Appendix D
The competitive equilibrium is described by the set {C∗,X∗,e ∗,h ∗,H∗,Y∗,w ∗} satisfying






























41The optimal steady state is described by the set
￿
￿ C, ￿ X,￿ h
￿
satisfying equation (13) and the











































1 + ￿ e
￿







Then, the optimal economic policy makes identical systems {(50),(51)} and {(52),(53)}.
The solution of this system of equations is displayed in (28).
Appendix E
Given that, at the equilibrium ht = ht ∀t, the social optimum is the same as in the












t=0 satisfying equations {(1),(3),(5),(29),(30)}
t=+∞
t=0 and








































Finally, changes appear only in the ﬁrst order condition with respect to ht+1. Using the same
method as in the Benchmark model, it is straightforward that there exists a unique vector
{λt,Λt}
t=+∞
t=0 that is able to decentralize the ﬁrst-best. After some straightforward calculus,
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